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GIDEON IN THE DESERT: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF PROVIDING COUNSEL TO 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN RURAL PLACES 
Andrew Davies & Alyssa Clark** 
ABSTRACT 
Access to counsel for criminal defendants is a continuing challenge in rural 
localities, notwithstanding the mandates of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  In this 
Article, we first review the state of the law on access to counsel in criminal cases, 
noting the latitude allowed to state and local governments in their policy decisions.  
We then examine empirical approaches to measuring access to counsel and describe 
in detail both the law and the data on this issue from the state of Texas. We present 
exploratory analyses of those data comparing rural and urban places for various 
aspects of access to counsel, including rules governing eligibility for, and rates of 
actual use of, appointed attorneys.  We find that Texas counties appointed counsel to 
an average of 29% of misdemeanor defendants in 2016-17, but that rates were 
significantly lower in rural than urban counties.  Total expenditures averaged $278 
per case, though 8% of that amount was recouped from defendants.  In rural areas 
specifically, we find the absence of any local towns and low lawyer populations were 
associated with especially low levels of access to counsel.  The presence of an 
organized defense provider such as a public defender office, however, was associated 
with significantly higher rates of access to counsel in counties.  Finally, we review 
our findings in the light of other research on the impact of programs targeting rural 
areas intended to improve access to counsel for defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gideon’s story as told in the Book of Judges is one of scarcity.  Gideon gathered 
an army of many thousands for an attack on a Midianite camp in the desert in the 
east of Israel, but before he was able to launch it he received a message from God 
that his force was too large.1  Gideon’s army needed to be smaller, God explained 
soteriologically, so that the Israelites knew it was God that was saving them.  Gideon 
first invites any person who is “fearful and trembling” to go home.2  Then, taking the 
army to drink, God commands that he only keep the men who “lap the water with 
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 1.  Judges 7:2. 
 2.  Id. at 7:3. 
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their tongues, as a dog laps” rather than cup the water in their hands.3  Gideon was 
left with 300 men, and God promises they will prevail.  Sure enough, the soldiers 
simulate an attack of a large army using trumpets and torches, and the Midianites 
flee without a fight.4 
Gideon v. Wainwright’s5 story, as told in the rural parts of America, is also about 
scarcity.  America’s rural counties struggle to provide legal services of any kind.  
Rural areas face intrinsic obstacles supplying counsel to criminal defendants unable 
to afford it.6  Geographic distances are too large, resource constraints too great, and 
the number of available lawyers simply insufficient.7  The practice of law in rural 
areas may be different if, as some evidence indicates, the Bar is more socially 
conservative, or more community-oriented.8  And people in rural places may be more 
inclined to resolve interpersonal issues without resorting to the law at all.9 
For criminal defendants the consequences of rurality are potentially serious.  
Uncounseled defendants do poorly in court.10  With no check on executive power, 
plea deals can be more rapid, less considered, and less fair.11  Uncounseled 
defendants face the real possibility of extended pretrial detention while lawyers are 
found.12 
Yet, not all rural places are the same.  States such as South Dakota have 
undertaken initiatives to incentivize lawyers to move to rural places and practice law 
there.13  In our own state of New York, following litigation, defense lawyers in 
Washington County (a jurisdiction partially located within the Adirondack mountain 
range) were able to implement a program to supply representation at every first 
                                                                                                     
 3.  Id. at 7:5. 
 4.  Id. at 7:15 to :25. 
 5.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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HARV. L. AND POL'Y  REV. 15, 20 (2018). 
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 9.  Id.; Hillary A. Wandler, Spreading Justice to Rural Montana: Expanding Local Legal Services 
in Undeserved Rural Communities, 77 MONT. L. REV. 235 (2016). 
 10.  Protecting the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors: 
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (2015) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. 
Judiciary Comm.); ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, MINOR CRIMES, 
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009); 
Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Kirstin A. Morgan, Providing Counsel for Defendants: Access, Quality, 
and Impact, in Lower Criminal Courts (Alisa Smith & Sean Maddan eds., forthcoming 2019); Thomas 
B. Harvey, Jared H. Rosenfeld & Shannon Tomascak, Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Prosecutions 
After Alabama v. Shelton: No-Lawyer-Courts and Their Consequences on the Poor and Communities of 
Color in St. Louis, 29 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 688 (2018). 
 11.  ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, THREE MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2011). 
 12.  Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333 (2011). 
 13.  Patrick G. Goetzinger & Robert L. Morris, Project Rural Practice: Its People and Its Purpose, 
59 S.D. L. REV. 444 (2014). 
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appearance by a defendant in each of the county’s dozens of local courts.14  Rurality, 
though seriously impinging on jurisdictions’ ability to supply counsel to defendants, 
does not seem to absolutely prevent it.  What, then, are the predictors of success in 
supplying access to counsel in rural areas? 
In this Article, we adopt an empirical approach to this question.  We begin with 
a brief review of what is known about access to counsel in criminal cases, stressing 
that notwithstanding the mandates of cases like Gideon, wide discrepancies in access 
to counsel for criminal defendants still exist.  Next, we review what is known about 
how these discrepancies play out in relation to rurality.  What has prior research 
shown to be true about the impact of rural circumstances on jurisdictions’ ability to 
supply access to counsel for criminal defendants?  In Section IV, we introduce our 
inquiry into access to counsel using data from Texas, the only state which, to our 
knowledge, maintains and publishes regular data on how policies and practices in 
the area vary in each of its 254 counties.  In Section V, we present these data, as well 
as other data describing the counties, and examine the discrepancies in access to 
counsel by rurality.  We close in Section VI with a discussion of how evidence from 
our present study compliments existing research—mostly qualitative in nature—on 
the differences in access to counsel in rural areas. 
To our knowledge, our analysis, incorporating data from 254 localities, is the 
largest ever performed on access to counsel issues in rural areas.  In brief, we find 
that access to counsel is indeed more limited in rural areas than in urban ones in 
misdemeanor cases.  But we also show the tremendous diversity in rural places in 
terms of access to counsel rates.  While we see our results as confirming the impact 
of rurality on access to counsel, therefore, we also note clear signs that access to 
counsel is possible in rural areas, given adequate resources, capable local leadership, 
and sensitivity to the distinctive nature of rural places. 
II. REPRESENTATION FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
Legal representation for persons accused of crimes is required to be provided 
gratis to any defendant facing the possibility of incarceration pursuant to the 
mandates of Gideon v. Wainwright,15 Argersinger v. Hamlin,16 and Scott v. Illinois.17  
A variety of other cases have clarified issues around the timing at which the right to 
assigned counsel first attaches,18 conditions under which counsel can be found to 
have been ineffective,19 where a conflict of interest prevents representation,20 and the 
circumstances in which defendants may proceed without counsel.21 
At first blush the requirements of these various decisions may seem to define 
                                                                                                     
 14.  Kathleen Moore, Public Defenders Making It to Arraignments in Washington County, GLENS 
FALLS POST-STAR (June 27, 2017), https://poststar.com/news/local/public-defenders-making-it-to-
arraignments-in-washington-county/article_87f6d843-ff6f-5cb3-9330-db4a6f299743.html 
[https://perma.cc/8C5Q-QF6E]. 
 15.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 16.  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 17.  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 18.  Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
 19.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 20.  Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987). 
 21.   Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). 
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the right to counsel for criminal defendants relatively precisely.  And yet, 
notwithstanding these guidelines, considerable latitude exists for states and localities 
to vary in the extent to which they provide access to defense counsel.  Just fourteen 
states guarantee that counsel will be present and available to assist defendants at their 
first appearance in court, rather than at some later stage.22  Twenty-eight states and 
the District of Columbia provide defense services through statewide agencies, while 
the rest delegate the service to counties or other local jurisdictions.23  A minimum of 
three alternative systems exist for providing counsel—staffed public defender 
offices, private “assigned counsel” lawyers appointed case-by-case, or a wide variety 
of alternative contractual arrangements.24  Twenty-eight states utilize the Federal 
Poverty Guidelines to establish guidelines for those who are considered ‘too poor’ 
to hire a lawyer, and therefore entitled to one provided by the government, but other 
states utilize other metrics.25  Actual funding for defense services themselves, 
meanwhile, varies widely—around ten-fold in per capita terms.26 
Notwithstanding that criminal defense services for persons accused of crimes 
are universally mandated, the level of devolution of responsibility for actually 
supplying those services to state and, often, local governments, has resulted in a wide 
variety of approaches, and appreciable differences in the extent to which criminal 
defendants are able to access counsel at all.  In the next section, we review existing 
research on this diversity, particularly as it relates to the rurality of jurisdictions 
around the nation. 
III. CAPTURING AND THEORIZING ACCESS TO COUNSEL 
What determines access to counsel for criminal defendants in rural areas?  
Research and data on this issue at the national level are scanty indeed.  The last report 
prepared by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on the issue, still widely cited, reports 
findings from 1996 showing that among felony defendants in state courts in the 
seventy-five largest counties in the nation, eighty-two percent were represented by 
court-appointed counsel.27  To our knowledge, no data whatsoever at the national 
level exist to show the rate of assignment of counsel in misdemeanor cases, or in 
                                                                                                     
 22.  THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DON’T I NEED A LAWYER?  PRETRIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL AT FIRST JUDICIAL BAIL HEARING 16 n. 70 (2015) (citing Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution 
Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 389 (2011)), https://constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/RTC-DINAL_3.18.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2KG-YKT6]. 
 23.  SUZANNE STRONG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE-ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSTEMS, 2013 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5826 
[https://perma.cc/W7FM-QNJH]. 
 24.  See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 53 (2009). 
 25.  John P. Gross, Too Poor To Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use the Federal 
Poverty Guidelines To Deprive Defendants of Their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1173, 1194 (2013). 
 26.  Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Alissa Pollitz Worden, State Politics and the Right to Counsel: 
A Comparative Analysis, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 187 passim (2009). 
 27.  CAROLYN WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 
(2000). 
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counties outside these large jurisdictions.28 
Analysis of other related issues have been conducted at the national level, 
however, particularly examining the amounts that states and localities spend on 
providing counsel to indigent defendants.  While expenditures are in large part a 
function of the supply of defendants, careful analyses have exposed the other 
political and geographic factors that are also at work.  Worden and Worden’s work 
in Georgia in the 1980s revealed that the presence of an active bar association in a 
county was associated with higher spending on indigent defense, suggesting that bars 
might operate as a kind of interest group pushing for increased services.29  Other 
analyses have revealed defense spending varies predictably with other characteristics 
of local jurisdictions, particularly their respective wealth, their predominant political 
ideologies, and their basic demographics including, indeed, their rurality.30 
Most prior work examining the provision of public defense services in rural 
places has focused on structural differences in defense systems.  Pruitt and Colgan, 
examining five Arizona counties, found a general trend toward lower spending per 
capita on defense in rural places.31  They went on to note the several correlated 
features of rural counties which might account for this pattern: reduced tax bases and 
higher poverty rates meant fewer resources available to pay for services generally, 
and few opportunities to achieve economies of scale.  Davies and Worden’s research 
in New York, meanwhile, found through a different research strategy that criminal 
defense in rural areas actually costs more to provide.  Their analysis compliments 
Pruitt and Colgan’s because it attempted to control for the many things that depress 
rural expenditures on items such as defense (particularly the tax bases which impose 
constraints on counties’ abilities to pay for defender services) and suggests that, net 
of these factors, the simple fact of rural geography imposes predictable additional 
logistical costs.32  Last, Davies and Clark examined opinions of judges in rural areas 
and found that while the overwhelming majority of judges favored counsel to be 
                                                                                                     
 28.  Noting this regrettable absence, the first author of this paper (Davies) and colleagues at the 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the International Legal Foundation joined in calling 
for a national effort to track appointment rates in criminal cases at a meeting of the White House Legal 
Aid Interagency Task Force in Washington D.C. in 2016.  That call has not yet been heeded. Andrew 
Lucas Blaize Davies, Indicators of Access to Justice for Defendants in Criminal Cases, in 
RECOMMENDED ACCESS TO JUST. INDICATORS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF GOAL 16 OF THE U.N. 2030 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. AGENDA IN THE U.S. 14 (2016); Jennifer Smith, Proposal for Inclusion of Access to 
Counsel/Legal Aid Indicator, THE INT'L L. FOUND. (2016); Jo-Ann Wallace & Radhika Singh Miller, 
Proposed Indicators at the Intersection of the Civil and Criminal Justice Systems to Address Cyclical 
Poverty, NAT'L L. AID & DEFENDER ASS'N (2016).  
 29.  Alissa Pollitz Worden & Robert E. Worden, Local Politics and the Provision of Indigent 
Defense Counsel, 11 LAW & POL'Y 401, 407 (1989). 
 30.  Id. at 8; Davies &Worden, supra note 26; Davies & Worden, supra note 6; Pruitt & Colgan, 
supra note 6; Alissa Pollitz Worden & Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies, Protecting Due Process in a 
Punitive Era: An Analysis of Changes in Providing Counsel to the Poor, 47 SPECIAL ISSUE: NEW PERSP. 
ON CRIME AND CRIM. JUST. STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 71 passim (2009), 
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/S1059-4337%282009%290000047006 
[https://perma.cc/7HD6-UVDC]; Alissa Pollitz Worden, Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Elizabeth K. 
Brown, A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process, and Public Defense Across American States, 74 
ALB. L. REV. 1423 passim (2010). 
 31.  Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 6, at 275, Figure 13. 
 32.  Davies & Worden, supra note 6, at 330, Table 2. 
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present in court, they were often unable to rely on it.  Judges in rural areas reported 
counsel was almost never present during the unscheduled and ad hoc arraignment 
proceedings that New York law requires must be held as soon as possible after a 
defendant’s arrest, and despite the judges’ clear preferences, there were few if any 
mechanisms in place to address that deficit.33   
Beside funding and resource constraints, critics of defense systems have often 
also pointed at rural assignment procedures themselves—that is, the processes by 
which defendants actually are assigned an attorney and put in contact with them—as 
inhibiting access to counsel.  In particular, criticism has focused on two things: the 
procedures put in place for the determination of financial eligibility for counsel, and 
the charging of fees to apply for, or receive, counsel’s services. 
Defendants must be judged “too poor to hire a lawyer” in the words of Gideon 
in order to qualify, but the definition of poverty was left open by the Court.34  Thus, 
whereas some jurisdictions may allow almost all persons who seek to be represented 
by counsel at no charge access to it, others may impose stringent barriers, requiring 
significant documentation proving need, or setting the bar for qualification closer to 
the poverty line, such that a defendant’s penury must be that much more acute to 
qualify.35  Jurisdictions may choose to police eligibility determination more 
vigorously through auditing or even, in one Texas case, the deployment of Sherriff’s 
deputies to check a person’s assets and income.36 
The charging of application fees, the use of part-payment schemes where 
defendants must contribute some percentage of costs, and the pursuit of defendants 
for recoupment of costs after cases are ended are also common across the country.37  
Notwithstanding that defense for those unable to afford it is supposed to be provided 
gratis, these kinds of fees are often levied as a way to reduce program costs, and 
sometimes seemingly to expedite case disposition, as when fee schedules increase 
with case length or complexity.38  The implications for access to counsel may be in 
                                                                                                     
 33.  Davies & Clark, supra note 6, at 17; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 2017) 
(requiring police officers to bring arrested persons to court “without unnecessary delay”); People ex rel. 
Maxian v. Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422, 427 (1991) (finding delays of over 24 hours are presumptively 
unnecessary). 
 34.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 35.  Gross, supra note 25, at 1190; see generally N.Y. OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., 
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL IN NEW YORK: A STUDY OF CURRENT 
CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT (2016). 
 36.  See Stephanie Butts, Investigator Making Dent in County’s Indigent Defense Costs, WACO 
TRIBUNE (May 30, 2014), https://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/investigator-making-dent-
in-county-s-indigent-defense-costs/article_1a2dd7ad-4b83-5680-ab5d-808f4b31f0b4.html 
[https://perma.cc/9TJV-QF9T]; see also Elizabeth Neeley & Alan Tomkins, Evaluating Court Processes 
for Determining Indigency, 43 CT. REV. 4 (2007). 
 37.  See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for 
Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045 (2006); Guilty and Charged, NAT'L PUB. 
RADIO (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/series/313986316/guilty-and-charged 
[https://perma.cc/C8LF-WKBE]. 
 38.  See ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE COSTS OF 
INDIGENT DEFENSE PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY SCREENING AND COST RECOVERY PROCEDURES (1986); 
Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their Court-Appointed 
Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2009); Gerald A. Bos 
& Eugene Livaudais, Reimbursement of Indigent Defense Costs Upheld, 49 TULANE L. REV. 699 
(1975).  
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the impact such fees have on defendant decision-making.  Presented with the choice 
of whether to pay a fee to obtain a government-funded lawyer, obtain counsel 
privately, or simply proceed altogether uncounseled, defendants might alter their 
choices about requesting a lawyer at all. 
Access to counsel is thus at once a matter of policy, practice, and dedication of 
funds.  At the policy level, access to counsel manifests in the form of rules about 
who may be granted counsel and who may not.  At the practice level, access to 
counsel manifests in terms of actual appointment rates—the proportion of defendants 
represented—and the choices judges and other authorities may make about requiring 
defendants to pay toward the cost of their representation.  And at the point of 
dedication of funds, access to counsel is manifested in a decision by a government 
on how much to pay for counsel itself.  Access to counsel is thus, in effect, a 
phenomenon that can be assessed and measured in all three ways.  We return to the 
question of how these three dimensions can be captured empirically using data from 
Texas in Section V.  First, however, we review the history of access to counsel in 
that state. 
IV. ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN TEXAS 
Policies on access to counsel in Texas are made at the local level, subject to the 
statutory language of Article 1.051 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.39  
Counties are free to choose rules for financial eligibility determination among 
defendants.40  Judges have the authority to determine the amounts defendants must 
repay for the services they receive on a case-by-case basis.41  Defense services 
themselves are largely funded from local revenues.42  And localities may also decide 
the service modality—whether defense will be delivered by staff attorneys in a public 
defender office, or by some other means.  In 221 of the state’s 254 counties, 
defenders are either contractors, paid by local governments to handle certain 
numbers or types of cases, or are “assigned counsel”—attorneys appointed by judges 
to represent defendants on a case-by-case basis.  These assigned counsel and contract 
systems vary in the financial terms they offer to attorneys and in their formality.  
While three counties have pioneered so-called “managed assigned counsel” 
programs where systems are in place intended to assign attorneys to cases based 
appropriately on skill level, caseload, and other factors, most allow judges 
considerable leeway in their choices on appointing and compensating attorneys.43  In 
fourteen counties a county-based public defender office has been established to 
                                                                                                     
 39.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (West 2005). 
 40.  Although the Texas Indigent Defense Commission has nominal authority to regulate these 
decisions, it has not created any standards to do so. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 79.034 (West 2013) 
(policies and standards). 
 41.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West 2018). 
 42.  The website of the Texas Indigent Defense Commission indicates total indigent defense costs in 
2018 of approximately $276 million while noting total disbursement by the state agency of $38 million 
in grants to counties to assist with these costs. See Indigent Defense Data for Texas, TEX. INDIGENT 
DEFENSE COMM’N, https://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/ [https://perma.cc/YRV2-YBR6]. 
 43.  Direct Client Services Chart 2018, TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM'N (Jan. 25, 2018), 
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/46142/direct-client-services-chart-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8VF-
SVWF]. 
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handle at least some of the county’s caseload, while a further four regional defender 
offices serve twenty-two additional counties.  An office in Lubbock County 
dedicated only to the defense of capital cases serves 177 counties in the state. 
Criminal defendants in Texas do not generally have access to counsel in person 
at the earliest stages of their cases, though they must have counsel “appointed” (even 
if in name only) at their first appearance before a judicial officer.44  A request for 
appointment at the initial appearance must be followed by a screening process for 
financial eligibility within three days in counties with populations of less than 
250,000, and one day for larger counties.45  Jurisdiction over cases transfers to either 
a District or County Court upon presentment of an indictment or prosecutorial 
information.  The state’s 462 District Courts handle primarily felony matters and 
may have overlapping geographic jurisdiction within counties.46  While populous 
counties have many District Courts, many smaller counties have just one.  Five 
hundred and one County Courts handle primarily misdemeanor cases.  While the 
Texas Constitution requires one County Court to exist in each county, a further 247 
Statutory County Courts have been created across the state to handle caseload 
overflow.47  A total of 1,744 Justice and Municipal Courts also exist at the local level, 
but the jurisdiction of these courts is limited to cases where the maximum possible 
penalty is a fine.  Justice and Municipal Courts may handle the early stages of 
misdemeanor or felony cases, however, including the determination of bail.48  As a 
consequence, defendants are often detained pretrial without the benefit of counsel.49 
Texas is no stranger to controversy when it comes to access to counsel for 
criminal defendants.  Prior to the 2001 passage of the Fair Defense Act, which 
required some oversight of counsel assignment procedures, Texas was characterized 
by “a complete absence of uniformity in standards and quality of representation” 
across the state, such that “[d]elay in appointing counsel soon after arrest is a 
pervasive and serious problem in a number of counties.”50  The passage of the Act 
did not appear to resolve access to counsel issues entirely, however, as evidenced by 
                                                                                                     
 44.  To our knowledge, counsel at first appearance in court is provided in only two Texas 
Counties—Harris and Bexar. TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, INDIGENT DEFENSE INNOVATION 14 
(2018), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/58029/tidc_indigent_defense_innovation_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JEC4-4DXV]; Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail 
Hearings, 31 CRIM. JUST. 23–47 (2016); EXPRESS-NEWS EDITORIAL BD., Public Defender Should Be at 
All Initial Appearances, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, (July 21, 2018), 
https://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/Public-defender-should-be-at-all-initial-
13092534.php [https://perma.cc/3D64-NBVQ]. 
 45.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(c) (West 2015). 
 46.  TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH, COURT STRUCTURE OF TEXAS (Jan. 1, 2019), 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1443399/court-structure-chart-jan-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/56T6-
88W9]. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 10. 
 49.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECT, supra note 22, at 42; Douglas Colbert, Ray Paternoster & 
Shawn D. Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of 
Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2002). 
 50.  TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, THE FAIR DEFENSE REPORT: FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON INDIGENT DEFENSE PRACTICES IN TEXAS 7, 9 (Dec. 2000), 
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/185-FairDefense-
ReportFindingsReccomendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LJE-8TLY]. 
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two cases—one in the Supreme Court—where access to counsel was a central issue. 
In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Walter Rothgery was arrested in error as a felon 
in possession of a firearm: he had no felony conviction.51  At his initial appearance 
in court, known in Texas as a “15.17 hearing” or “magistration,” he requested 
counsel but ultimately waived the right to have counsel present because he was told 
it would delay his release on bail.52  After his release he made several subsequent 
requests to be appointed counsel, which went unheeded, only obtaining it after a 
grand jury indictment fully six months after magistration.53  Following the 
indictment, Mr. Rothgery was reincarcerated as a result of an increase to his bail but 
was later released after his newly appointed attorney produced evidence showing 
Rothgery was not a felon.54  The Fifth Circuit held that no Sixth Amendment rights 
had been implicated because no prosecutor had been present at the initial hearing,55 
but the Supreme Court reversed, with Justice Souter writing that “a criminal 
defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge 
against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary 
judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.”56 
A settlement in the class action lawsuit Heckman v. Williamson County57 
revealed by implication some of the factors that were behind low rates of access to 
counsel in that county.  Data gathered by Texas Indigent Criminal Defense 
Commission (TIDC) revealed that access to counsel in misdemeanor cases had fallen 
to as low as eight percent in 2006 when the lawsuit was filed.58  The settlement 
required the county to remedy a range of ills including assuring that all requests for 
counsel be conveyed and ruled upon within twenty-four hours; that defendants would 
be provided with attorney contact information; and that defendants should not be 
required to speak with a prosecutor prior to waiving their right to counsel.  In 
addition, any decision by a defendant to waive counsel should be accompanied by a 
discussion on the record, and the settlement called for Williamson County to 
introduce measures that would increase public access to the courtroom.59 
Notwithstanding these efforts at policy reforms and court decisions, assurances 
of access to counsel for defendants in Texas are still only ambivalent.  While 
appointment processes may begin at the initial court appearance, the actual presence 
of counsel in person is rarely assured.  Localities are free to make policies governing 
access, which may impinge on the ability or inclination of defendants to seek it.  And 
                                                                                                     
 51.  Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 195 (2008). 
 52.  Id. at 196 & n.4; see also TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 15.17(a) (West 2019). 
 53.  Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196-97. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 491 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
 56.  Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213. 
 57.  Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012). 
 58.  Jon Mosher, Williamson County TX Settles “No Counsel Court” Lawsuit, SIXTH AMENDMENT 
CTR. (Jan. 24, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/williamson-county-tx-settles-no-counsel-court-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/H9D6-8J7U]. 
 59. Joint Motion to Dismiss, Heckman v. Williamson Cty., No. 06-453-C277 (D. Ct. Williamson 
Cty., Jan. 14, 2013) http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Joint-Motion-to-Dismiss-
Heckman-et-al-v.-Williamson-County-et-al-.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L4R-8SYB] (full settlement 
agreement in the case).  
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transecting all of these considerations, Texas varies enormously in terms of 
urbanization, raising the question of whether the structure of courts and justice 
systems in urban and rural areas vary in fundamental ways, impinging systematically 
on access to counsel itself.60  To examine the precise impact of rurality on access to 
counsel in Texas, we made use of the rich archives of data published online by TIDC.  
It is to our analysis of these data that we turn next. 
V. DATA AND METHODS 
How far do rural areas differ in terms of access to counsel, and why?  To address 
this question, we gathered and analyzed data from the 254 counties in Texas, each 
of which (because defense is locally controlled in that state) is empowered to make 
its own decisions on access to counsel.  Texas varies significantly in its level of 
rurality between the sprawling cities of Houston and Dallas to the (literally) 
desertified counties in the west of the state.  It is, in effect, a perfect opportunity to 
compare rural and urban areas in terms of access to counsel. 
In this endeavor, we are assisted greatly in the publication of comprehensive 
data on the website of the TIDC.61  There, the plans that counties are required 
biennially to submit to TIDC are available, containing information on the eligibility 
determination policies in place in each.  TIDC also reports three data points that are 
invaluable to our inquiry: the percentage of misdemeanor charges defended with 
appointed counsel, the percentage of felony charges defended with appointed 
counsel, and the amount of funds recouped from defendants in each county, by year.  
Last, the site also posts data publicly on the total amount spent by each county on 
defense services.  Unlike any other state of which we know, Texas publishes annual 
statistics for each of its 254 counties reflecting access to counsel from the 
perspectives of policy, practice, and funding.   
We use these data to address three specific questions.  First, in keeping with the 
few other analyses that already exist, is access to counsel lower in rural counties in 
Texas when compared to urban ones?  Given the opportunity to examine this 
question with a larger sample of counties than in previously published research, we 
seek to confirm this earlier finding.  Second, how diverse are rural counties in terms 
of access to counsel?  Is rurality an absolute barrier to access, such that no rural areas 
show high levels of access, or is there variety among rural counties?  Third, among 
rural counties themselves, what differences do we see between places where access 
is accomplished and those where it is not?  Are there characteristics of counties—
whether demographic, geographic, or political—which correlate with access levels 
in ways that allow us to predict when rural counties are more able to supply access 
to counsel effectively?  This study is (to our knowledge) both the largest and the 
most direct attempt to study quantitatively access to defense counsel policy, practice, 
and funding, anywhere in the United States to date. 
We gathered data both on the extent of access to counsel in each county and on 
                                                                                                     
 60.  For a variety of visualizations of Texan rurality by county, see U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. 
RESEARCH SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/53180/25598_TX.pdf?v=0 
[https://perma.cc/2GMY-77K4]. 
 61.  TEX. INDIGENT CRIM. DEF. COMM’N, http://www.tidc.texas.gov/ [https://perma.cc/TU6V-
5YJM]. 
256 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
a variety of county characteristics including but not limited to their rurality.  Our 
intent in procuring a diverse dataset was to permit us to examine not only the basic 
differences in access levels between counties deemed ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ but also to 
permit examination of the characteristics of rural counties which were associated 
with particularly high or low levels of access.  These data were obtained from the 
TIDC website as well as a variety of other sources.62  Basic descriptive statistics 
concerning the data we gathered can be found in Table 1 and are described further 
below.  Unless otherwise noted, all data refer to 2017. 
 








Access to counsel metrics 
Eligibility threshold in District Court 
(n=239) 100% 200% 122.53% 20.68% 
Eligibility threshold in County Court 
(n=238) 100% 200% 121.43% 18.29% 
% Misdemeanors Appointed Counsel 
(n=253) 0% 123% 29.69% 22.42% 
% Spending Recouped (n=254) 0% 74.10% 8.04% 8.60% 
Expenditures per weighted case 
(n=251) $12.32 $1,866.82 $277.78 $175.21 
System metrics 
Felony cases brought to court 
(n=254) 0 40,918 1,100.29 4,033.49 
Misdemeanor cases brought to court 
(n=254) 0 60,425 1,853.92 6,124.29 
Juvenile cases brought to court 
(n=254) 0 7,647 114.77 546.48 
Total Weighted Cases (n = 254) 5.67 184,970.1 5,021.24 17,792.21 
Weighted Cases per Capita (n=254) .01 .43 .06 .04 
Indigent Defense Spending, 
thousands (n = 254) $1 $45,200 $1,026 $3,958 
County has institutionalized defender 
(n=254) 0 1 .14 .35 
Demographic, geographic, and political metrics 
Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 1 9 5.19 2.62 
County “Nonmetro” (n=254) 0 1 .68 .47 
Total area in square miles (n=254) 148.7 6,192.3 1,057.47 656.73 
Population (n=254) 74 4,525,519 417,951 389,477 
Population per Square Mile (n=254) .11 2,808.95 106.93 320.65 
                                                                                                     
 62.  All data on indigent defense in Texas were obtained from TEX. INDIGENT CRIM. DEF. COMM’N, 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/ [https://perma.cc/2VUY-9V9V]. 
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% of population White (n=254) 40.30% 100% 84.15% 10.06% 
% of population below poverty 
(n=254) 2.8% 41.5% 16.34% 5.94% 
Median Household Income (n=254) 24,794 93,645 49,894.34 12,132.68 
% Voting Republican, 2016 
Presidential (n=254) 18.9% 94.6% 71.81% 16.29% 
Attorneys per Square Mile (n=254) 0 18.24 .33 1.64 
Attorney Median Wage (n=254) 49,330 148,000 84,235.98 18,996.52 
Estimated property tax levy per 
capita (n=254) $168.70 $166,316 $1,506.56 $4,033.49 
 
A. Access to Counsel Metrics 
We measure access to counsel from three perspectives—as a policy, as a 
practice, and as a dedication of funding.  First, as a policy, access to counsel is 
captured by a county’s rules on eligibility.  Eligibility policies are captured in our 
data through income cut-points.  Typically, both for defense services and a range of 
other social and welfare support, applicants are assessed by comparison of their 
income to the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), a metric which has come in to criticism 
for its outdated assumptions about household expenditure patterns.63  At their most 
stringent, counties considered anyone making more than the FPL to be ineligible—
a position expressed as “100%” in our metric because the cut-point was set at 100% 
of the FPL.  Others enacted less strict policies, with the least restrictive setting 
eligibility at 200% of FPL, meaning that any person with income below twice the 
poverty level could obtain counsel for free.  Although District Courts and County 
Courts can set their own eligibility rules and we present data for each respectively in 
Table 1, they tended to operate in lockstep with one another within counties. 
Second, as a practice, we quantified access to counsel using appointment and 
recoupment rates.  Texas produces two appointment rates—one for felony cases and 
one for misdemeanor cases—by dividing the numbers of cases in each category for 
which attorneys were paid in a year by the total of such cases filed.  Here, we focus 
on the misdemeanor appointment rate.  We do so partly because misdemeanors are 
an area in which access to counsel has been shown to be especially tenuous, but also 
because of a limitation of our data.64  Because cases can only be counted as “paid” 
after their conclusion, whereas cases are counted as “filed” at their inception, 
appointment rates can generate seemingly invalid values above 100% where, for 
example, a large number of backlogged attorney bills from a prior year are paid all 
at once.  To minimize this problem, we averaged appointment rates across two years 
(2016 and 2017) but still found thirty-five counties had rates in felony cases in excess 
of 100%, some many times higher, making analysis difficult.  Misdemeanor 
appointment rates proved much more stable, however, perhaps owing to the higher 
                                                                                                     
 63. See generally Gross, supra note 25. 
 64.  Entitlement to counsel for accused misdemeanants is more tenuous and variable across states.  
See generally B. Mitchell Simpson, A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors Entitled to 
Court Appointed Counsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 417–439 (2000). 
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caseloads of this type.  Just three counties had appointment rates over 100%.  On 
average, appointment rates in misdemeanor cases were 29.6%.   
We constructed a measure of recoupment using TIDC’s published data on how 
much counties recovered from defendants for the services they received.  Dividing 
that number by the total the county spent on defense, we obtained a measure 
expressing recouped funds as a proportion of overall spending, which is intended to 
capture the degree to which defendants themselves were, as a group, required to 
cover the cost of their defense.  On average, counties recouped eight percent of 
defense spending.  Where counties reported recoupment as a higher percentage of 
the overall cost of defense, we infer that access to counsel is diminished.65 
Last, in terms of funding, we capture access to counsel as a resource 
commitment as “dollars spent per weighted case.”66  The amount each county spends 
per case is a reasonable way to assess whether funding levels for defense generally 
are relatively more fulsome or more meager.  Weighted cases were calculated using 
the formula set forth in the National Advisory Commission standards for the 
weighting of cases in the defense function.67  These standards weight felony cases, 
for example, to be equivalent to 2.67 misdemeanor cases and are a way to compare 
caseloads across jurisdictions in a way that captures not only how numerous, but also 
how serious the cases in question are.68  Dividing each county’s total expenditures 
on defense into the number of cases gives the amounts counties are accustomed to 
paying for representation in a single misdemeanor case—averaging around $278.  
Counties which pay more, we infer, may be characterized as more willing to support 
the defense function financially, and, therefore, as having made more sizable 
financial commitments in support of access to counsel. 
B. System Metrics 
We present basic caseload information about our counties next.  We obtained 
the total 2017 caseload of the court systems in each county—including cases where 
                                                                                                     
 65.  See generally Anderson, supra note 38. 
 66.  This metric standardizes spending on defense by dividing by the total number of cases 
represented, effectively showing the average amount spent on representing a client in a single case.  
However, the number of cases is ‘weighted’ such that felony cases, for example, are counted as 
equivalent to 2.67 misdemeanor cases, in recognition of their greater complexity.  Weighting is a 
common practice in the computation of caseloads and is necessary for like-with-like comparisons 
between jurisdictions where caseloads are composed of significantly different proportions of felonies 
and misdemeanors.  For jurisdictions that have “weighted” or “credited” some cases as requiring more 
time than others, see NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS IN LAW AND 
PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011) at 140.  
 67.  NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals, The Defense (Black Letter), http://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/national-
advisory-commission/black-letter [https://perma.cc/QHA5-2F5J]. 
 68.  The standards stipulate in calculating defender caseloads that felony cases should be considered 
equivalent to 2.67 misdemeanor cases, juvenile cases as equivalent to 2 misdemeanors, and appeals as 
equivalent to 16 misdemeanors. See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 65. No 
national standards exist for the weighting of capital cases, so we chose to follow a Tennessee practice of 
weighting them as equivalent to 80 misdemeanors. SUSAN MATTSON, FY2005-2006 TENNESSEE 
WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY UPDATE: DISTRICT PUBLIC DEFENDERS (2007) (for Tennessee standard). 
For criticism of the National Advisory Commission standards, see NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING 
REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS IN LAW AND PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011).  
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defendants would have been represented by publicly funded counsel, where they 
retained their own attorney, or were represented by none.  Weighting those caseloads 
in accordance with National Advisory Commission standards reveals that counties 
averaged over 5,021 misdemeanor-equivalent cases in 2017.69  Expressing those 
same weighted caseloads in per capita terms gives a metric akin to a crime rate: 
where the average county in Texas had six cases brought to court for every 100 
inhabitants, the county with the busiest court system had forty-three—more than two 
new misdemeanor-equivalent cases for every five people in the county.  On average, 
counties spent just over $1 million on defense services, though counties ranged from 
$1,000 to over $45 million.  Lastly, fourteen percent of counties (or thirty-six 
individual counties) had some form of either public defender office or ‘managed 
assigned counsel’ system operating in it.70  All others provided defense services 
through less clearly institutionalized means, including contract defenders and 
assigned counsel systems. 
C. Demographic, Geographic, and Political Metrics 
We employ the Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCC) produced by the United 
States Department of Agriculture Environmental Research Service to distinguish the 
degree and type of urbanization in each county in Texas.71  There are a variety of 
approaches to measuring rurality in the United States, and choices among them 
depend on their appropriateness both to the questions being asked and the analytic 
approaches employed.72  In our case, the RUCCs are apt because they refer to 
counties rather than “metropolitan statistical areas” or other units—and counties are 
also the jurisdictions where decisions about the delivery of defense services are 
made.  Second, RUCCs have often been utilized in the analysis of service delivery 
to hard-to-reach populations, particularly in health and human services.73  Rather 
than simply capturing population density or land usage, the RUCCs focus on the size 
and proximity of urban centers among counties, and thus are particularly appropriate 
for identifying counties close to urban areas where service providers, including 
lawyers, are likely to be available.  RUCCs are calculated decennially: we employ 
the most recent codes, from 2013. 
RUCCs organize counties into nine categories.  Most intuitively, a county’s 
position on the scale depends on whether it has an urban center inside it and on the 
size of that urban center.  Also important in the scale, however, is whether a county 
                                                                                                     
 69.  See supra, Table 1.  “Misdemeanor-equivalent” refers to the fact that, for this metric, counts of 
other cases have been multiplied according to a weighting system to be expressed in terms of their 
relationships to misdemeanor cases.  Thus, as the weight for a single appeal case is 16, a single appeal 
counts in this metric for 16 “misdemeanor-equivalent” cases.  For details on these standards, see NAT’L 
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 67. 
 70.  TEX. INDIGENT CRIM. DEF. COMM’N, http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/46142/direct-client-
services-chart-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB3K-J9C6]. 
 71.  Rural-Urban Continuum Codes, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., USDA, 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urban-continuum-codes.aspx [https://perma.cc/TDW5-
DKUA]. 
 72.  THOMAS C. RICKETTS & KAREN D. JOHNSON-WEBB, WHAT IS “RURAL” AND HOW TO 
MEASURE “RURALITY”: A FOCUS ON HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND HEALTH POLICY (1996). 
 73.  See Jeanne F. Cook, Keith A. Alford, & Pat Conway, Introduction to Rural Families and 
Reshaping Human Services, 15 J. FAMILY SOC. WORK 351, at 355-356 (2012). 
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borders another county with an urban center to or from which large numbers of its 
residents commute.74  Thus, counties are considered “metropolitan” if they have any 
urbanized area over 50,000 people, or if they are adjacent to a county with such an 
area and over twenty-five percent of workers commute to or from that second 
county.75  Metropolitan counties subdivide into three categories depending on 
whether the metropolitan area of which they are a part has a population over 1 million 
(Category 1), 250,000-1 million (Category 2), or under 250,000 (Category 3).76  
Hereinafter, we refer to counties in categories 1 through 3 as “urban.” 
Nonmetropolitan counties (hereinafter referred to as “rural”), on the other hand, 
are ranked in categories 4 through 9 based on broadly similar rules.  Categories 4 
and 5 contain an urban area of at least 20,000; 6 and 7 contain an urban area of at 
least 2,500; and 8 and 9 contain only urban areas under 2,500.  Classifications across 
each pair depend, again, on whether the county is adjacent to an urban county, 
following the same twenty-five percent commuting rule.  The codes are summarized 
in Table 2, which also shows the numbers of Texas counties falling into each 
category. 
 
Table 2: Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 
Code Description TX Counties 
Metropolitan Counties 
1 Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more 35 
2 Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population 25 
3 Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population 22 
Nonmetropolitan Counties 
4 Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to metro area 13 
5 Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to metro area 6 
6 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to metro area 65 
7 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to metro area 39 
8 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to 
metro area 
20 
9 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not 
adjacent to metro area 
29 
 
We also obtained data on a range of other metrics, several obtained from the 
United States Census (total population, percent of population identifying as “white” 
alone, total area in square miles, population density, percent of population below 
poverty line, and median household income).  We obtained the proportion of the 
county’s population that voted for the Republican candidate in the 2016 Presidential 
                                                                                                     
 74.  RUCC codes “distinguish metropolitan counties by the population size of their metro area, and 
nonmetropolitan counties by degree of urbanization and adjacency to a metro area.” See Rural-Urban 
Continuum Codes, supra note 719. 
 75.  What is Rural?, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., USDA, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-
economy-population/rural-classifications/what-is-rural/ [https://perma.cc/WS2V-ATUY]. 
 76.  See Rural-Urban Continuum Codes, supra note 719. 
2019] GIDEON IN THE DESERT 261 
election from the New York Times.77  Attorney wage data were obtained from a 
database constructed by the American Bar Association, and the number of practicing 
attorneys per square mile was computed by dividing county-level attorney counts 
from a report by the State Bar of Texas by the total area of each county.78  Estimated 
property tax levies were calculated by the Texas Comptroller’s office.79 
VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
How does access to counsel in criminal cases vary with rurality?  We approach 
this question three different ways.  First, we look at urban and rural counties 
respectively to assess whether our metrics of access to counsel—eligibility policies; 
appointment and recoupment practices; and spending per case—differ across the two 
groups at levels that can be considered statistically significant.  Second, we examine 
the diversity in misdemeanor appointment rates between urban and rural counties, 
seeking to discover the extent to which access to counsel rates are consistent among 
counties in each group or whether they overlap.  Third, we examine differences 
between rural counties and ask: what factors are associated in rural counties with 
higher rates of access to counsel?  In so doing, we raise the question of whether 
certain factors, when present in a county, may allow it to overcome the constraints 
imposed by rurality to provide broad access to counsel nonetheless. 
A. Comparing Access to Justice in Urban and Rural Counties 
We compared urban and rural counties on our metrics of access to counsel, 
defense services, and demographic, geographic and political factors.  To perform the 
comparisons we employed “difference of means” t-tests, an analytical technique 
which assesses whether differences between groups are large enough that they are 
unlikely to be due to chance alone and are thus statistically significant as outlined in 
Table 3).80  
 
Table 3: Comparing Non-rural and Rural counties in Texas  
                                                                                                     
 77.  See Texas Election Results 2016,  N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/texas [https://perma.cc/Y8JY-TBM4]. 
 78.  See Ian Monroe, Search Lawyer Wage Data for Your County, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/search_wage_data_for_your_county/ 
[https://perma.cc/U4RE-8DJP]; STATE BAR OF TEX. DEP'T OF RES. & ANALYSIS, ATTORNEY 
POPULATION DENSITY BY METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, (2018), 
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=40396&Template=/CM/Cont
entDisplay.cfm [https://perma.cc/2CRU-FV43]. 
 79.  TEX. COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/docs/2017-
county-rates-levies.xlsx [https://perma.cc/M2V7-2HS4]. 
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Eligibility rate, 
District Court 119% 124% No -1.74 (237), p=0.08 
Eligibility rate, 
County Court 119% 123% No -.152 (236), p=0.13 
Appointment rate, 
misdemeanors 38.8% 25.3% Yes 4.67 (251), p<0.01 
Percent defense costs 
recouped 8.12% 7.99% No -.11 (252), p=0.91 
Spending per 
weighted case $269.70 $281.70 No -0.50 (249), p=0.61 
System metrics (selected) 
Felony cases brought 
to court 2,896.56 747.41 Yes 5.14 (252), p<0.01 
Misdemeanor cases 
brought to court 4,907.18 398.30 Yes 5.83 (252), p<0.01 
Weighted cases per 
capita 0.05 0.06 Yes -2.41 (252), p=0.02 
County has 
institutionalized 
defender  0.16 0.13 No 0.53 (252), p=0.60 
Demographic, geographic and political metrics (selected) 
Total area (sq mi) 977 1095 No -1.34 (252), p=0.18 
People per square 
mile 289 20 Yes 6.77 (252), p<0.01 
Percent White 82.0% 85.1% Yes -2.34 (252), p=0.02 
Population below 
poverty 15.3% 16.8% Marginal -1.96 (252), p=0.05 
Median household 
income $56,687 $46,655 Yes 6.67 (252), p<0.01 
Republican vote, 
2016 presidential  66% 74% Yes -3.70 (252), p<0.01 
Attorneys per square 
mile 0.98 0.03 Yes 4.47 (252), p<0.01 
Median attorney 
wage $98,130 $77,612 Yes 9.31 (252), p<0.01 
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Table 3 presents selected metrics for defense services, demography, geography 
and politics.  Although not significantly different in geographic size, we find rural 
counties in Texas have around one-fourteenth the population density, one-fourth the 
felony caseload, and one-twelfth the misdemeanor caseload of urban ones.  Per 
capita, however, caseloads are actually higher in rural areas, at six cases per hundred 
inhabitants in rural counties to five in urban counties—a slight, but statistically 
significant, difference.  Rural county populations are slightly whiter and slightly 
more likely to be below the poverty line.  Median household incomes are 
substantially lower and the proportion voting for the Republican candidate in the 
2016 Presidential election substantially higher.  Looking at the population of 
attorneys specifically, the differences are starker: rural counties have just one-thirty-
fifth the population of attorneys of urban counties—a discrepancy so large it cannot 
be accounted for by population differences alone.  Average annual wages for 
attorneys, meanwhile, are a full $20,000 lower in rural counties than in urban ones. 
Turning to access to counsel itself, however, some commonalities emerge.  Most 
counties relied on assigned counsel and contract providers of defense, and the 
likelihood they had institutionalized their defense system was no greater in urban 
than rural areas.  Spending per weighted case was only minutely higher in rural areas 
and not sufficiently so that the difference was statistically significant.  Rules 
governing financial eligibility of defendants for free or subsidized attorneys did not 
differ significantly either, with both urban and rural counties averaging slightly 
below 125% of the Federal Poverty Line.  While both urban and rural counties did 
recoup some proportion of their defense costs, they each recouped very similar 
amounts, around eight percent of costs.  Finally, it was only in the rates of 
appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases that a statistically significant urban-
rural difference in access to counsel emerged.  Just twenty-five percent of 
misdemeanor defendants in rural counties receive appointed counsel compared to 
thirty-nine percent in urban counties. 
Are these statistics a sign that access to counsel for defendants in rural places is not 
as distinctive or different as scholars have previously imagined?  Certainly we find no 
clear evidence here of wide disparities—excepting misdemeanor appointment rates, 
where rural residents clearly experience access to counsel at lower rates.  That lack of 
access is not reflected, however, in any accompanying differences in policies governing 
eligibility for counsel, recoupment practices, or spending levels.   
But we must also bear in mind that the metrics presented here, while illustrative, 
may not adequately capture access to counsel in its fullness.  We do not have metrics 
that capture the precise nature or quality of defense services being provided in each 
county—for example, whether attorneys engaged in investigation, motion practice, 
or communicated with clients appropriately.81  Therefore, we are left with more 
questions than firm conclusions.  The fact that defense services in rural areas cost 
the same as in urban ones does not mean they are identical, for example.  Are 
countervailing forces at work—for instance, is the higher cost of transportation 
compensated by the lower cost of efficient processing in small courts carrying few 
cases?  More research would be needed to know for sure. 
                                                                                                     
 81.  See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (A.B.A. 2015).  
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B. Comparing Diversity in Misdemeanor Appointment Rates Between Rural 
and Urban Counties 
In that spirit, we focus in next on misdemeanor appointment rates—the one area 
in which significant differences were found between rural and urban counties.  Does 
the fact that average appointment rates are significantly lower in rural counties imply 
that that rurality imposes absolute limits on access to counsel?  To find out, we 
prepared two plots, shown in Figure 1, showing the diversity of appointment rates in 
misdemeanor cases in rural and urban counties separately.  Counties where 
appointment rates are close to 0% appear on the left of each plot.  Counties where 
appointment rates are close to 100% appear on the right.82 
 
Figure 1: Misdemeanor appointment rates, comparing non-rural and rural counties. 
 
 
Contrary to the supposition that rural counties are simply incapable of supplying 
access to counsel, Figure 1 shows there is significant diversity in misdemeanor case 
appointment rates across both urban and rural counties.  In both groups, counties seem to 
run the gamut from appointing counsel in almost no cases to appointing it in almost all 
of them.  Whatever the impact of rurality on appointment rates, it is not determinative: 
there are plenty of rural counties where many defendants in misdemeanor cases are 
assigned counsel and plenty of urban ones where they are not.   
But the two plots do, of course, appear substantially different.  Whereas urban 
counties show no particularly obvious tendency toward either high or low 
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appointment rates, rural ones are strongly skewed toward the left, closer to zero.  
While rurality does not absolutely determine appointment rates, and while it is 
evidently possible for counties to overcome the constraints it imposes on their ability 
to appoint counsel, there are still profound differences in appointment rates in this 
group of counties. 
C. What Factors Are Associated with Higher Rates of Access to Counsel in 
Rural Areas? 
We have shown that access to counsel in rural areas is, in one domain at least, 
lower than in urban ones.  But we have also shown that the range in access to counsel 
among rural counties on that same metric is considerable.  All of this raises a new 
question: what are the characteristics of rural counties which appear to be most 
successful in providing access to counsel?  By answering this question, it might be 
possible to begin to identify factors that predict “success” among counties in 
providing access to counsel despite their rurality. 
For this analysis, we used ordinary least squares regression to examine 
relationships in the data pertaining to the 172 rural counties.  Regression is a method 
which can be used to quantify the strength of relationships between particular 
variables while holding other variables constant.83  For example, the method allows 
us to study whether counties with more strict eligibility policies appoint counsel at 
lower rates, while simultaneously controlling for other factors that might obscure or 
confound any relationship, such as the number of cases or the average income of 
county residents.  Importantly, this method can never, strictly speaking, allow for us 
to infer that any relationship between two variables is causal in nature.  But 
inferences about possible causal relationships can be made. 
We began our analysis with a series of hypotheses about factors likely to 
influence access to counsel.  First, we expected access to counsel to be an economic 
issue.  Counties with larger tax bases, we thought, would generally extend access to 
counsel more widely because they would have the fiscal capacity to do so.  At the 
same time, we expected median income in a county to be associated with reduced 
access to counsel because wealthier populations would tend to have less need of free 
defense services, being able to retain counsel privately.   
Second, we expected access to counsel to be a reflection of the court system 
itself.  Our prior analyses in New York have found that where case volume is higher, 
courts are more likely to find ways that defendants can be brought together in large 
enough numbers at predictable times to allow counsel.84  Accordingly, we controlled 
for the number of court cases in the county per capita.  We also expected that where 
the public defender system was institutionalized in the form of a centralized office 
or other managed program, access to counsel would likely be greater. 
Third, even among rural counties, we expected access to counsel to be higher 
where counties had urban centers and larger numbers of lawyers.  Urban centers tend 
to be where lawyers live and work and will also tend to be the places that courts with 
                                                                                                     
 83.  See generally COLIN LEWIS-BECK & MICHAEL LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2015). 
 84.  KARISE CURTIS & ANDREW LUCAS BLAIZE DAVIES, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 2014 SURVEY 
OF TOWN AND VILLAGE MAGISTRATES: COUNSEL AT FIRST APPEARANCE (2014).  
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higher case volumes are located.  In combination, these circumstances seemed to us 
to make access to counsel more likely.  Our RUCC codes allowed us to identify all 
counties with a center of at least 2,500 people in it, so we used this indicator in our 
analysis.  Following in the work of other scholars that have studied lawyer scarcity, 
we also expected that the population of lawyers in rural areas would impact access 
to counsel.85  We therefore controlled for attorneys per square mile.   
Fourth, building on prior analyses which have shown justice policies, including 
defense services, to be more stringent and punitive where political climates are more 
conservative, we expected that the size of the Republican vote in the 2016 
presidential election would be associated with lower access to counsel.  The results 
of our analysis are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Results of regressing access to counsel metrics onto county 




























































































wage    
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant 129.39 -1.57 2.40 584.18 
R2, n 0.03, 161 0.09, 172 0.15, 160 0.10, 159 
 
Cells contain unstandardized coefficients and standard errors. 
* = p<0.1, ** = p < 0.05 
                                                                                                     
 85.  Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 6; Wandler, supra note 9. 
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The first column of Table 4 shows the results of our analysis examining the 
associations between the variables above with County Court eligibility rates.86  Our 
analysis reveals that eligibility rates are entirely uncorrelated with any of the 
variables we used in our analysis.  This is somewhat surprising: we had expected 
counties of particular types—politically conservative, lacking in resources, or 
otherwise—would use eligibility policies to restrict access and thereby control the 
costs of providing counsel.87  One possibility for the lack of any such relationships 
is that counties recognize that eligibility policies are the only available tool 
controlling the cost of providing counsel.  Other more direct approaches include 
changing the terms of contracts with providers or negotiating different hourly rates. 
In the next column of Table 4, we examine correlates of the practice of 
recoupment.  Here our analysis shows two important findings.  First, counties with 
an institutionalized defender function (either a public defender office or another 
managed defense program with its own staff) have recoupment rates around four 
percentage points lower than counties with no such function—a substantial margin 
given that on average counties recouped just eight percent of costs annually.  Second, 
we find counties which voted for the Republican candidate in the 2016 presidential 
election recouped more of what they spent for defense.  The results suggest a 1% 
increase in the vote for the Republican candidate is associated with a 0.12% increase 
in the recoupment rate.  Rural counties averaged seventy-four percent support for 
that candidate but ranged as high as ninety-four percent: counties at the top of that 
range therefore recouped between two and three percentage points more of indigent 
defense costs than those at the mean. 
The next column contains the results of our examination of appointment rates in 
misdemeanor cases.  For these analyses we retained the variables used in the analyses 
for the first two columns and added eligibility and recoupment policies as predictors.  
Our logic was that while we thought appointment rates would likely be influenced 
by the factors previously mentioned, eligibility policies and recoupment practices 
themselves could also cause appointment rates to be lower or higher.  Where 
eligibility policies were more lenient, we expected higher appointment rates; where 
recoupment rates were higher, we expected defendants to be deterred from 
requesting assignment of counsel, and therefore, appointment rates would be lower.  
Consistent with the structure of Texas courts, we employed County Court eligibility 
rates for our analysis of appointment rates in misdemeanor cases. 
Our results suggest that appointment rates in misdemeanor cases are far more a 
product of the simple unavailability of attorneys in rural areas than they are of policy, 
political or economic factors.  Appointment rates were eleven points higher in 
counties where the defense function was institutionalized, suggesting that the 
presence an identifiable agency whose job it is to provide defense services will tend 
to be associated with improved access to counsel.  Rates were a full thirteen 
percentage points higher in counties with a small town.  These differences are 
substantial, considering average appointment rates in rural counties were just twenty-
                                                                                                     
 86.  We also performed this analysis for District Court eligibility rates.  Results were substantially 
the same. 
 87.  Some indication of the controversy that may surround eligibility determination may be gleaned 
from a study we conducted in New York. See N.Y. OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., supra note 35  
at 5. 
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five percent.  Incremental changes in the population density of attorneys, and in 
county politics, also made a difference.  Rural counties averaged 0.03 attorneys per 
square mile—but appointment rates in counties with double that density were 1.4% 
higher.  Contrary to our expectations, we also found that counties where the 
Republican vote at the 2016 presidential election had been higher appointed counsel 
in misdemeanor cases more often.  A 1% increase in that vote was associated with a 
0.24% increase in appointment rates. 
Eligibility policies themselves, meanwhile, do not feature in our findings.  We 
show no relationship between the policies a county may put in place to determine 
financial qualifications for entitlement to counsel and the actual rate at which counsel 
are assigned.  We take this as further confirmation of our suspicion that eligibility 
policies are not themselves determinative of assignment practices.  Rather, judges 
are empowered to make assignments in cases where they feel it is fit, and it is likely 
that eligibility policies, while a factor in those decisions, are not the last word.  
Indeed, we find precious little evidence of their influence at all. 
Last, we assessed correlates of spending per case.  While we expected spending 
per case to be contingent on local politics, economics and geography, we found no 
evidence of strong relationships here.  Nor did we find evidence that recoupment and 
appointment practices themselves were significantly associated with spending, 
suggesting that where counties use eligibility and recoupment as supposed cost-
cutting measures, they may not be particularly effective. 
VII. DISCUSSION: BEYOND THE STATISTICS—PROSPECTS FOR REFORM IN RURAL 
PLACES 
Our results reaffirm the practical importance of rurality in determining access to 
counsel for criminal defendants.  The statutory framework governing access to 
counsel in all Texas counties is identical, and yet defendants in misdemeanor cases 
face a substantially lower likelihood of receiving appointment of counsel in rural 
areas than in urban ones.  Among rural counties, access to counsel improves where 
counties have the trappings of urbanization: small towns and more attorneys living 
locally.  The institutionalization of the defender function itself is also consequential.  
In part, we have rediscovered, albeit with a larger and more powerful dataset, the 
reality that rural areas impose logistical barriers to providing defense services at all.   
Elsewhere in our results we detect other narratives.  First, not all rural areas are 
the same.  Overall, misdemeanor appointment rates in rural areas, though 
significantly lower than urban areas on average, ranged equally widely in rural and 
urban counties alike.  Second, institutionalization of the defense function matters.  In 
places where counties have taken the step of forming an agency dedicated to 
providing defense representation, access to counsel was better.  Third, the local 
political climate makes a difference.  Strongly Republican counties were more likely 
to recoup a larger proportion of defense system funding from defendants themselves 
(a trend in keeping with what has been described elsewhere about the impact of 
conservative political environments on defense policy and justice policy generally), 
but were also more likely to appoint counsel at higher rates in misdemeanor cases.88 
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Regarding institutionalization of the defense function in particular, we note 
Maine is the only state in the United States that relies entirely on an assigned counsel 
system for providing defense representation.  Unlike other states, all of which rely to 
some extent on staffed offices in the “public defender” model to supply 
representation, Maine has retained the more traditional model whereby judges assign 
cases to attorneys in private practice who provide representation for a fee paid by the 
government.89  These systems are frequently criticized on structural grounds: private 
attorneys accepting ad hoc assignments may be distracted by their commitments to 
paying clients, and may not benefit from the esprit de corps of being a member of a 
public defense institution.90  Some analyses suggest there is merit to these concerns: 
one study of homicide cases in Philadelphia indeed showed that institutional 
defenders significantly outperformed assigned counsel at case disposition.91  To this 
we add our finding that assigned counsel systems in rural Texas also provided less 
access to counsel for defendants than institutional defenders.  We do not 
automatically conclude all assigned counsel systems must be failures, however.  
Rather, we recommend to those who choose to deliver defense services in this way 
that they work to establish mechanisms to assure the quality of services provided 
through adequate funding, oversight, and other efforts to create a culture of 
excellence in delivery of representation. 
We also recognize that while some of the diversity in access to counsel was 
accounted for in our statistical analyses, much was not.  Fully eighty-five percent of 
the diversity—or more technically the “variance”—in misdemeanor appointment 
rates among these counties remained unexplained in our model.92  Much of the 
variety of experience among rural areas remains to be explained; while structural 
factors like the presence of small urban centers and an institutionalized provider of 
defense services clearly make a difference, there remains ample scope to speculate 
that other local cultural factors, some of which may not be readily amenable to 
quantification, may also be at play. 
For further discussion of this possibility, we turn partly to our own experience 
building programs intended to foster access to counsel across rural upstate New 
York, and partly to the published work of others engaged in similar projects.  Like 
Texas, New York is a locally-controlled system featuring large numbers of local 
courts operating with little oversight.  Somewhat distinctively, though, recent 
litigation and legislation in New York has required the Office of Indigent Legal 
Services to improve access to counsel across the state.  Specifically, it has been 
mandated to implement programs to provide counsel to all defendants at first 
appearances in court, to reduce defender caseloads statewide, and to revise eligibility 
                                                                                                     
 89.  Scott Dolan, Lawmakers To Air Proposal for Maine’s First Public Defender Office, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.pressherald.com/2016/01/14/lawmakers-to-air-proposal-
for-maines-first-public-defender-office [https://perma.cc/7Z7J-MHG2]. 
 90.  See SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN UTAH: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL-
LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (2015). 
 91.  James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect 
of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 159 (2012).  
 92.  The R2 values in Table 4 measure the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable (in 
this case the misdemeanor appointment rate) that can be accounted for by the independent variables.  In 
this analysis, the R2 was 0.15. 
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standards statewide, setting the income threshold for eligibility for counsel at 250% 
of the Federal Poverty Line.  Those reforms have also, critically, been supported by 
injections of state monies intended fully to fund these improvements.93 
Past work in New York examining the implementation of reforms to access to 
counsel contains important lessons both for would-be reformers and for researchers.  
First, written policies on eligibility may not capture the nuances of how access to 
counsel is really granted.  We surveyed all of the judges on New York’s 1,215 justice 
courts in 2014 and asked them about how eligibility was determined and whether 
counsel was present in their courts at defendants’ first appearances.94  Presiding over 
mostly-rural jurisdictions averaging just 7,000 in population, these judges rarely 
resorted to formal imposition of eligibility determination processes when assigning 
counsel.  In most cases, financial eligibility was a simple determination based on the 
defendant’s demeanor or avowal.  Judges took these shortcuts because they 
recognized assigning counsel was the procedurally safest option, protecting verdicts 
from potential appeal.  They saw it as more efficient, avoiding any additional delay 
from defendants returning to court multiple times only to say they had still not 
retained counsel.  And they saw its presentational and symbolic value too: some 
judges simply believed that in any court counsel for both sides should be present and 
took seriously their obligation to guarantee that sense of fairness.95  Therefore, access 
to counsel policies may be more complicated than simple income cut-points suggest.  
To improve access to counsel, policies and their impact need to be properly studied 
and understood. 
Second, access to counsel reform in rural areas is achievable, but even when 
funding and resources are available, it requires careful planning and support from 
unlikely allies.  Two studies, one on the implementation of programs to provide 
counsel at first appearance in five diverse counties in upstate New York and one on 
a program to provide access to counsel during police station interviews in Chicago, 
revealed some of these complexities.96  In New York, even with full funding for the 
programs provided by state government and a cohort of committed and determined 
defense administrators overseeing program development, the task of improving 
access to counsel in rural places required personal commitment and support from 
key local players.  Reform was most successful when it had the support of the local 
judiciary, who had to accept the logistical demands of assuring presence of counsel; 
of county legislatures and executives, who had to approve and oversee the program; 
and of prosecutors and law enforcement, whose own roles and responsibilities would 
change with the introduction of new services.97  These alliances and collaborations 
could be hard to sustain, testing defenders’ diplomatic skills and their ability to 
                                                                                                     
 93.  William J. Leahy, The Right to Counsel in the State of New York, 51 IND. L. REV. 145 at 145 
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 94.  Davies & Clark, supra note 6, at 17; Alyssa M. Clark et al., Access to Counsel for Criminal 
Defendants in Lower Criminal Courts (unpublished manuscript). 
 95.  Davies & Clark, supra note 6, at 18. 
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withstand or adapt to resistance.  In Chicago, likewise, logistical problems dogged 
the implementation of the new program, requiring implementers to revisit and refine 
protocols and procedures that were failing.98  These were ultimately stories of 
success but also object lessons in why simply injecting funding into rural programs 
is not enough to generate an impact.  To improve access to counsel, resources must 
be accompanied by careful plans for implementation and a realistic approach to 
bringing needed partners aboard. 
Third, understanding the full range of factors that are at play when producing 
access to counsel policy and reform requires research approaches that go beyond the 
readily identifiable and quantifiable characteristics of places.  It is easy—but perhaps 
too easy—to say that access to counsel is just inherently harder to provide in rural 
areas where resources are scarce and logistical obstacles large.  These things do 
indeed impinge on access to counsel, but they do not absolutely determine it.  During 
our work in New York, we were able to identify sets of counties where quantitative 
approaches to understanding their policies simply fell short: their levels of spending 
on defense were either consistently higher, or consistently lower, than we predicted 
based on what we could quantify.99  To understand what we were missing, we went 
back to interview data that we had on file with defenders in these over- and under-
performing counties, and discovered striking contrasts.  Not only were the counties 
in question clearly separated by the economic, demographic, and political factors 
that we could quantify, but they were also separately by three other dimensions that 
we labeled ideas, influence, and infrastructure.  Defenders in well-funded counties 
were charismatic leaders (people with “ideas”) who wielded local political clout (had 
“influence”) and who had set up offices which had internal strength in the form of 
adequate supporting, non-attorney staff (“infrastructure”).  Those in poorly-funded 
counties were, in starkest contrast, demoralized, disenfranchised, and poorly 
institutionalized.  Strong local leadership, effective alliance building, and simple 
geniality are not readily measurable so they don’t feature in our regression analysis.  
Yet research applying qualitative approaches can be used to great effect to 
demonstrate their importance empirically. 
These findings are a clear reminder of the fact that counties, rural or urban, are 
not simply collections of statistics specifying population density and tax bases.  They 
are also communities—political communities, in particular—where relationships, 
personality, and history go an awfully long way toward explaining policies on issues 
like access to counsel.  Success in guaranteeing access to counsel in rural areas, 
though it may require funding injections and rule changes, also requires coalition-
building, leadership, and persistence.  Political reform, particularly in an unpopular 
and largely disregarded policy area like indigent defense, occurs not simply as a 
consequence of stable characteristics of places.  It occurs as part of a political 
process, often a negotiation, where relationships and power structures and 
institutions are the factors that shape policy.  Poor access to counsel doesn’t simply 
follow from poor funding and geographic obstacles; it also follows from the 
discretion of judges, the agendas of politicians, and the energy of local 
administrators. 
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From the perspectives of reformers working on rural justice issues, this should 
be encouraging.  There is something to be said for the distinctiveness of rural areas 
in terms of the challenges they face inherent to their rurality.  But there is nothing 
inevitable about rurality that need prevent access to counsel from being achieved.  
With dedications of resources, and perhaps even more importantly, local leadership 
and commitment, access to counsel should attainable in every county in the United 
States. 
